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RUSSIA RESPONSE TO UKRAINE AND KYRGYZSTAN COLOUR REVOLUTIONS

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines Russia's response to the color revolutions in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan as they fit with the account of anti-Westernism. The revolutions, the famous rallies that happened in Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan and toppled the pro-Russian governments in those countries, assumed a significant job in the development of Russia's links with the West. They made a story of a continuous movement of pro-reform, pro-democracy sweeping through the previous Soviet Union that could spread across the whole region, including Russia. The officials of Russia saw the West as the root of the color revolutions and stated that Western-financed NGOs were purposely attempting to subvert the governments of the color upheaval nations, by helping the youth and activists movements that pushed the rallies to win. Russia dreaded the outcomes of Western democracy advancement and political decision observing, officials endeavored to impede the two activities and built up the narrative of free democracy as a means of defending their actions.

KEYWORDS: *Russia, Color Revolutions, NATO, EU, Ukraine, And Kyrgyzstan.*

INTRODUCTION

The color revolutions in the previous Soviet states of Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the incident sent surprise waves all through the world. The government of Russia, specifically, saw the color revolutions as a danger to its influence on the nations where the color revolutions occurred, which could be an objective for color revolution, and to its link with the West. Therefore, Russia makes a move to neutralize the impact of the color revolutions.

In the past decade, Moscow has returned the global stage with an aggressive international strategy of considerable worry to Washington. In 2014, Russia attached the Crimean area of Ukraine and offered help to separatists in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Last few years, Russia has increased its interference outside the previous Soviet domain, by mediating in the Syria strife on the Asad regime. Because of global aggression of Russia, the 2015 America Security strategy put Russia as a significant danger to global security, which America is looking to counter through military and diplomacy (White House, February, 2015).

The foreign policy of Russia become imperative to America security interests. Therefore, an assessment of the contributing elements that have affected Russian strategy may assist with directing America reaction to Russia's increased global aggression. In analyzing the ways that the color revolutions have influenced Russia's links with America, and EU, this paper examines the possible hidden causes of Russia's rising foreign strategy decisions. Understanding Russia's observations of the color revolutions, and the activities that followed will also be an element to consider as America and other Western allies proceed with their tradition of advancing democratic government and empowering non-administrative association support in nations of the previous Soviet Union.

This paper attempts to overcome any issues between occasions of the color revolutions, and Russian international strategy that has developed in their consequence. In analyzing explicitly the manners by which the color revolutions have affected Russia's anti-Western view, this paper can add to the bigger collection of work that has inspected both the Russian international strategy and the color revolutions of the most recent decade.

The interest of NGO during the Color Revolutions:

Western NGOs have assumed key jobs in the color revolutions. America related supporters of the color revolutions incorporated the Open Society Institute, Freedom House and the U.S. State Department (Soltanifar, Mohammad, 2005: 8-13). The NGOs gave subsidizing to protestors during the color revolutions, helped with preparing and advertising, and directed free polling of the elections. The entirety of the color revolutions helped by NGOs working in those countries.

While obviously, the NGOs assumed a job in the color revolutions, the degree of this job is under question. Russia and some other experts contend that the existence of the NGOs undermines the possibility of the revolutions as prominently run. He composes that, "Western media would, in general, depict the 'revolutions' in Ukraine as really well known and indigenous changes, to a great extent disregarding the job of America financing and America non-administrative associations in supporting the counter government movements in the two nations (Soltanifar, Mohammad, 2005: 8-13)."

In Ukraine, a large number of similar NGOs (NDI, USAID, and Freedom House) additionally operated to monitor for fair and free elections. The exit polling and monitoring of election directed by these and other autonomous Western-sponsored NGOs additionally indicated the divergence between the exit polls and vote count. Exit polling can be a basic instrument in the hands of protestors, who can utilize them as publicity against the formal vote tally of the government (Zielys, Povilas, 2013, 171-187). Besides, exit polling will show up first, preceding the formal check, giving protestors the lead in revealing the votes and compelling the government to react to any ensuing inconsistencies between the formal results and the exit polling.

America support for the Tulip Revolution and the wish for democratic changes that it spoke to implied that Kyrgyzstan got a lot of help for its upheaval from NGOs effectively present in the nation, who gave subsidizing, organize with the youth lobby, and led election observing (Landry, Tristan, 2011: 1-24). The broad financial help given to Kyrgyzstan by Western nations and the United States in the 1990s prompted the existence of an enormous number (Juraev, Shairbek, 2008: 253-264). For instance, in 2003 the Open Society Institute use \$20 million to back active democratic rallies in the five previous Soviet countries of Central Asia (Soltanifar, Mohammad, 2005: 8-13).

Tristan Landry contends that Western-invested groups, under the appearance of NGOs, entered Kyrgyzstan for the elections of 2005 and encouraged the mass rallies to secure America benefits in the Manas base (Landry, Tristan, 2011: 1-24). Regardless of whether it is completely evident that America straightforwardly added to the Tulip Revolution, the

government of Bush organization voiced endorsement for the Tulip Revolution and emphasized its solid promise to democracy advancement in all nations of Central Asia (Rumer, Eugene, 2006: 141-154). This help facilitated the recognition that America government may energize rallies in other tyrant countries.

The interest of NGO after the Color Revolutions:

Even, after the color revolutions, NGO contribution in those nations didn't end. In the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, election observing NGOs kept on working unbiasedly and cause to notice irregularities in a later election (Zielys, Povilas, 2013, 171-187). America funding for NGO help to the two nations declined for coordinating funding toward reinforcing state organizations, with expectations of making shared objectives between the government and the NGOs. Yet, the result of this financing shifts the NGOs in Ukraine incapable of satisfying their capacity as watchdogs human rights and democracy. America funding additionally diminished for the media Ukraine in the outcome of the color movements, leaving them to rely on local finance and compromising their capacity to stay ready to report dispassionately.

America and Kyrgyzstan's relations bad after the Tulip Revolution, in spite of America backing for the Tulip revolution and the craving for democratic changes. The President of Kyrgyzstan, Bakiyev demonstrated little enthusiasm for connecting with the West. For training and education, he looked to China and Russia to combine his capacity (Sari, Yasar, 2012: 131-150). Not long after coming in government, he visits Russia to consult with Putin and strengthen their relationship and the supremacy of their impact in Kyrgyzstan's international strategy. Bakiyev additionally organized Kyrgyzstan's participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperative Organization over their participation in the more Western-controlled associations. He even pulled back from Western aid, dismissing participation in the Highly Indebted Poor Nations program of the IMF. Rather, Bakiyev got significant money from Russia (Morozova, Irina, 2009: 86-97). China and Russia, being near neighbors, could maybe be more depended on to aid Bakiyev on the off chance that he ran into trouble keeping up local force.

In the interim, America was flagging that it probably won't be a dependable partner to the Central Asian governments. By backing the Tulip Revolution and in condemning the Andijan emergency that happened in Uzbekistan right away after that, America motioned to the Central Asian nations that democracy advancement would keep up associations with the governments in power. America endorsement of the Tulip Revolution spoilt relations with the nations of Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan, that dreaded for the stability of their government. Eugene Rumer expresses, "If America was eager to break links with Uzbekistan, its nearest partner in Central Asia, and backing the Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, so what the rest of the nations will expect? America set up to forfeit stability for democracy, a business that was bad for the leaders of Central Asia (Rumer, Eugene, 2006: 141–154)." The cost of democracy left America progressively dependent on Kyrgyzstan to accomplish its goals in the region of Central Asia.

The response of Russia:

Russian perspectives toward western NGOs were to a great extent positive during the 1990s, and the NGOs, alongside the democracies of West from which they started, were happy to assume the best about Russia as it gave off an impression of being going down a moderate road to democracy. Regardless of claims of fixed elections during the 1990s, the West kept on supporting Yeltsin and neglect the nondemocratic occasions (Saari, Sinikukka, 2009: 732–755). Putin, as well, gets the benefit when initially elected, and his good foreign strategy met with little blame from the West. However, reports from NGOs portrayed a united world-class power and a move toward expanding dictatorship as strife emerged between the Putin government and the NGOs.

Both government authorities and scholastics have rushed to paint NGOs as government-change specialists of West (Koesel, Karrie J., and Valerie J. Bunce, 2013: 753–768). While Russia has exceptionally constrained capacity to impact the NGOs operating in different nations, Putin has presented laws in Russia that forestall the arrangement and subsidizing of foreign NGOs. Putin asserted that NGOs were getting funds from affluent foreign donors over their essential missions. From that point forward, limitations on NGOs have expanded in Russia. Nicolas Bouchet expresses, "Russia's rising interpretation of countering color revolutions concentrated on defusing their soft power channels, for example, in communications and information, elections and common society, as opposed to 'hard power' suppression or prevention (Bouchet, Nicolas, 2016: 1–4)."

The Putin government is additionally opposing NGOs locally by endeavoring to make elective organizations that would assist the same capacities from NGOs. This exertion started to be acknowledged with the 2005 formation of an official state organization call the Civic Chamber, which had the apparent mission to fill in as mediator between state specialists, residents of Russia, and NGOs (Finkel, Evgeny, and Yitzhak M. Brudny, 2012: 15–36). Yet, the elections for individuals from the Civic Chamber led to guarantee that participation consisted of just authority-endorsed individuals, who might not challenge the legislature.

Russia is additionally opposing Western NGOs through the making of its universal associations to confront Western democracy-promotion endeavors. Russia built up the Institute for Cooperation and Democracy, and the start branches in New York and Paris. The stated objectives of the organizations are to encourage the discussion with NGOs and the general population over election decision checking and the electoral procedure, alongside privileges of children, national minorities, kids, and the right to speak freely. Furthermore, Russia set up the Russian World Foundation, which finances Russian global NGOs and funds associations that work with Russian people group abroad. Saari expresses, "It is wonderful that while censuring Western players for financing civil society movement in Russia and consequently meddling in its interior issues, Russia is at the same time straightforwardly venturing up its commitment in anti-assistance and counter-promotion (Saari, Sinikukka, 2009: 732–755)."

The Color Revolutions (Negative Outlining):

The color revolutions confronted the possibility of Russian democracy. Since they were, on a fundamental level, movements planned for throwing out undemocratic and corrupt leaders lined up with Russia. Per Stefanie Ortmann stated that the Russian leaders should keep up the image of Russia as a democratic country, they needed to discover another motivation to restrict the color revolutions and didn't involve the government of Russia as being against self-determination and democracy. Rather, they chose a narrative that surrounded the color revolutions as incited by the West, which opposed the picture of the color revolutions as famous, local uprisings, and permitted Russia to infer that Western powers would direct comparable revolutions at home country. Ortmann expresses, "In any case, the prevailing narrative set forward by Kremlin that the Orange Revolutions was a piece of an American arrangement, actualized with the assistance of incognito tasks by foreign NGOs, the logistical help for youth gatherings, the funding of opposing movements and that America would endeavor to export this progressive model further (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378)."

The color revolutions depicted by the government of Russia as illicit coups which happen in new nations that despite everything have delicate political foundations. Russian authorities blamed America and its partners of going around the ordinary democratic procedure in these nations by encouraging revolution as opposed to working in the current government. Additionally, Russian authorities started to confront the Western norms of democracy and worldwide democracy advancement and to counter with their associations. Saari states, "It is wonderful that while scrutinizing Western players for financing common society action in

Russia and accordingly meddling in its inside matters, Russia is all the while transparently venturing up its commitment in anti-assistance and counter-advancement (Saari, Sinikukka, 2009: 732–755)." The Tulip Revolution was not such a stun to Russian identity just like the uprisings in Ukraine (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378). Yet, the Tulip Revolution, coming so not long after the other two, appeared to confirm doubts that these revolutions were a piece of a "wave" that took steps to overwhelm the entirety of the previous Soviet circle. It likewise filled in as further "proof" that America was associated with directing government changes to encourage its objectives of spreading democracy and America impact (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378). One revolution is shocking, and a subsequent revolution could be a fortuitous event; however, a third revolution established an upsetting example that should have routed to forestall further spread.

Russia has prevailed with regards to persuading its public that the color revolutions were ineffective. A negligible 3% of Russians accept that life better in Kyrgyzstan after revolutions, and just 6% have the same opinion about the revolutions in Ukraine. So as to show strength in regards to the color revolutions, Russia expected to find a way to forestall the further spread of the color revolutions. Bunce contends that both China and Russia utilized negative confining of the color revolutions to separate their governments from the occasions of the color revolutions. They additionally contend that the negative confining helped the governments in Beijing and Moscow to give further authenticity by displaying their capacity to shield their nations from destabilizing Western impedance and to advance stability. Bunce express, "Measures that try to contain the contagion impacts related with waves of the well-known uprising in other dictator governments send an unmistakable sign to normal residents, opposition parties, and governments allies that tyrant heads stressed over their grip on power (Koesel, Karrie J., and Valerie J. Bunce, 2013: 753–768).

COUNTERING WESTERN INFLUENCE:

Another Russian reaction to the color revolutions was to guarantee that the nations included would remain monetarily reliant on Russia. Yet, the monetary vulnerabilities of these nations additionally added to the delicacy of their governments despite the color revolution unrests. Lucan Way takes note of that: "Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan needed key monetary and hierarchical assets, which made these governments especially defenseless against elite or opposition mobilization (Way, Lucan, 2008: 55–69). "Russia has utilized financial means to expand its influence in the region. Russia has additionally expanded its power in the previous Soviet nations through its role as the biggest migrant accepting nation on the planet, for the most part from the other previous Soviet nations (Jonavicus, Laurynas, 2009: 12–37). These remittances and migrants back to their home countries, which both support their economies and furthermore give Russia significant social and mental connections with the individuals who fill in as migrants or who are bolstered by the remittances. Jonavicus expresses, "Russian image as the nation in which it is conceivable to earn more cash than in own nation fundamentally expands Russia's 'power', which permit to live better and earn more (Jonavicus, Laurynas, 2009: 12–37)." It stands interestingly with the EU, which confines the migrant laborers from other countries and it further reinforces links between Russia and non-EU countries of the previous Soviet Union.

Conflict in Ukraine:

Russia utilized monetary pressure on Ukraine as a method for affecting Ukrainian strategy toward more noteworthy participation with Russia. Jonavicus states, "Business structure and financial relations in Ukraine are extremely interrelated with Russia because of soviet history. Despite the fact that the trade balance similarly appropriated among the EU and Russia, the strategic relationship is progressively helpful for Russia (Jonavicus, Laurynas, 2009: 12–37)." Ukraine particularly has a lopsided trade connection with Russia. Ukraine depends on Russia for energy and furthermore depends on Russia as a key purchaser for Ukrainian items.

Russia, then again, can offer energy to different states and compensate for the loss of Ukrainian business. In this manner, Russia has the high ground when arranging trade bargains.

Ukraine is a significant purchaser of energy, and vigorously reliant on Russia as the provider of that energy in oil and gas. Before 2004, Ukraine got energy endowments and loosened up installment deadlines from Russia, this leaving Ukraine with no reasons to decrease its energy reliance. After the Revolution, the energy organizations especially Gazprom took steps to repeal their agreements with Ukraine, and stop Ukraine's energy supplies if the nation didn't follow the new prices. Pricing differences stay till 2006, when Gazprom stop its energy supplies to Ukraine, persuading Ukraine to fix the differences in support of Russia. Besides, the energy firms of Russia have been utilizing their profits to buy value stakes in Ukrainian firms that control enormous divisions of the nation's economy, and increment their power in Ukraine (Kramer, Mark, 2008: 112–118).

The government of Yanukovich had the option to turn around the higher prices in return for more noteworthy collaboration with Russia. In 2010, Russia and Ukraine marked an agreement in which Russia would decrease the cost of gas for Ukraine by 33%, in return for a 25-year allowance on the lease to the maritime base in Sevastopol, regardless of the way that facilitating foreign soldiers forever on Ukrainian soil damages the Ukrainian Constitution. Russia's utilize energy prices as a negotiating advantage for more prominent influence in Ukraine appeared to be effective.

Kyrgyzstan:

Russia utilized monetary means to make sure about further influence after the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan that the Russia-accommodating Bakiyev government was glad to acknowledge. Russia has exploited the monstrous corruption in the energy part of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan authorities reported in 2008, the privatization of the gas organization and preparation for its possible deal, alongside other telecom and hydroelectric companies (Marat, Erica, 2008: 15–22). Gazprom promptly bought a stake in the organization and consented to help with the privatization (Kiselyova, Maria, October 9, 2008). Eventually, Gazprom bought Kyrgyzgaz by and large, in return of \$40 billion in debt, and make sure about an arrangement that permits them to exports all gas from Kyrgyzstan for the following 25 years (Russia Today, April 10, 2014). Bakiyev got a loan from Russia in 2009, and also backing of \$1.7 billion for the hydroelectric dam (Sari, Yasar, 2012: 131–150). Russia was eager to use genuine financial support to reassert its power in Kyrgyzstan with the new government, and they were glad to acknowledge.

At the finish of Bakiyev's government, links with Russia get bad. Bakiyev may be sure of his power solidification, moved in the direction of America after the election in 2009 (Cooley, Alexander, 2012). Russia had offered \$2 billion to Kyrgyzstan in crisis and requested to close the Manas Transit Center, a place being utilized by America so as to move troops into Afghanistan. Once Bakiyev marked a new agreement with America for the Manas Transit Center, Russia repealed the crisis support, yet not before the harm to Russia's local influence. Russia was discontent with the change, and Putin blamed the leaders of Kyrgyzstan for neglecting to stay faithful to their obligations with Russia (Sari, Yasar, 2012: 131–150). In reprisal, Putin utilized TV stations to freely blame Bakiyev for corruption. Besides, Russia cancelled favored taxes to Kyrgyzstan, making cost increase on significant imports from Russia, particularly oil. It highly affected the political instability and the nation's economy. Maybe because of the exacerbating relations between Kyrgyzstan and the Russian governments, Russia didn't intercede in Kyrgyzstan to forestall the breakdown of the Bakiyev government in 2010, regardless of requests from Kyrgyzstan's president for help.

Russia narrative on democracy:

Independent democracy developed from Russia's desire to advance national sovereignty. Ortmann expresses, "The utilization of democracy in Russian authority revealed the political setting in which it was utilized, and this implied references to moderate democratic standards had gotten more vulnerable; yet democracy kept on being utilized to portray the character of the Russian state (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378)." Because it stayed significant for the Russian people and the universal community to consider Russia to be a democracy, the government of Putin required a way to isolate the idea of democracy from the Western-style. The progress of a Russian belief of sovereignty and a solid-state expected to keep on being viewed as democratic, even as dictator goals impacted it. The mix of solid-state and regard for sovereignty without totally getting away from democracy was transformed into the idea of sovereign democracy by scholars and authorities of Russia.

The idea of independent democracy presented in 2005, soon after the color revolutions. The possibility of democracy was laden for Putin's Russia. The idea of democracy had for quite some time been related to the moderate Western idea, and with Western strength in the circle of worldwide politics. As Putin's links with America soured in the wake of difference on the Kosovo battle, the NATO extensions, and the War on Terror, Russia's meaning of democracy additionally started to move. Independent democracy rose as a counter to the different revolutions, and particularly to the idea that the color revolutions pushed by Western funding. Ortmann contends that independent democracy isn't in direct rivalry with Western democracy. Rather, it is a declaration of Russian weakness over the soundness of the Russian state, and dread of disorder that may undermine its suitability.

Independent democracy permitted the Putin government to make an ideological and political motto around which it can plan strategy. The objective of independent democracy was to give ideological authenticity to the government party and give the lead to regulate the ideological narrative.

The democracy of Russia got attached to its character as a Great Power and the sovereignty and autonomy that Great Power position could bring. Independence at that point when related to democracy, as it was free to ensure opportunity and self-assurance. Ortmann composes, "Independent democracy' was placed with regards to a narrative, in which America was subverting the autonomy of nations through the advancement of democracy abroad, government change' with a definitive point of making government faithful to America, as in Iraq, or use revolutions (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378)." In the perceptive of Russia, this put the color revolutions and Western supporters contrary to an independent democracy.

Putin admits to being pro-democracy; however, his independent democracy has given doubt on the movements of democracy. By underscoring the privileges of national sovereignty, he would then be able to presume that any local development which related with foreign players abuses that sovereignty and is along these lines ill-conceived (Okara, Andrei, 2007: 8–20).

Toward the West, the color revolutions are real democratic developments. The leaders of Russia disagree, and they utilize the idea of independent democracy to define their situation on the unfair idea of the color revolutions. Since the color revolutions contained external influence, sovereignty has been abused and accordingly they can't be democratic. Rather they depict the color revolutions as prompting to a government dominated by outside players. With respect to Russian perceptive, Okara composes that the post-color revolution governments "don't set themselves in the objective of achieving veritable sovereignty and subsequently exist under the support of different nations." Therefore, leaders of Russia can utilize sovereign democracy to sabotage democratic movements.

After the Tulip revolution:

Soon after the improvement of independent democracy, the ideology was implemented in the outcome of the Tulip Revolution to depict the Revolution in an unhelpful light. For

Kyrgyzstan's, Russia made a much more grounded case about the revolutions making issue instead of democracy. The Revolution was followed not long after by the Andijan slaughter in Uzbekistan. Despite the fact that there were little links between the two occasions, they permitted Russia to integrate the dread of turmoil from the color revolutions and the danger of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia, affirming the requirement for more prominent security in the area (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378). This story of the Tulip Revolution as making issue likewise integrates with the account that America involvement in government change in that region, as in Afghanistan, brings more terrorism dangers. The authorities of Russia ventured to such an extreme as to call the Andijan revolution a failed unrest, and to attach it to America democracy advancement endeavors. In this way, Russia endeavored to integrate America democracy advancement and color revolutions with Islamic terrorism, to depict the color revolutions as disordered and hazardous.

When the Tulip Revolution happened in Kyrgyzstan, the ideas of independent democracy had the option to be placed into use by Moscow to counter the idea of democratic change coming from Bishkek. In particular, Russia criticizes America for instigating local unrest. Russia likewise criticized Islamic terrorism and the Andijan revolution that happened presently, resounding Russia's feelings of trepidation of Islamic terrorism in the southern Caucasus and Chechnya. Besides, by unlegalized the Tulip Revolution, Moscow could likewise provide a reason to feel ambiguous about the authenticity of the color revolutions that led it.

If Western influence impelled the Tulip Revolution, at that point, it came up short on the self-assurance segment required for it to be really democratic. Instead, Moscow confined the Tulip Revolution as making disorder, not democracy. Along these lines, Russia could restrict it while as yet professing to be a democratic nation and to honor democracy somewhere else. Igor Ivanov (ex-foreign minister) stated that the color revolutions "government change by illegal and nondemocratic methods (Nikitina, Yulia, 2014: 87–104)."

Political analyst Andrannik Migrainian criticized America participation in the Tulip Revolution for increasing destabilization in the nations of Central Asia. He contended that the leaders of Central Asia no longer view America as making peace to the region. Ortmann expresses, "The move of speaking to the 'influx of revolutions' as a threatening factor, as opposed to an issue of qualities, and particularly the securitization of the Tulip Revolution, reverberated with genuine feelings of trepidation about turmoil and the collapse of the nation." Moscow's reframing of the Revolution was additionally the making of a narrative for the past color revolutions as a 'rush of revolutions' that were threatening instead of democratic.

The narrative of Russia has been fruitful in propelling Russia's international strategy aim of decreasing America influence and presence in the nations of Central Asia, leaving Moscow as the important power broker. Additionally, the members of the SCO requested America and its alliance accomplices set a deadline for removing troops from basing in the nations of Central Asia (Rumer, Eugene, 2006: 141–154).

The leaders of Uzbekistan not happy from the negative America response to the Andijan massacre and blaming America interference in the nations of Central Asian. They removed the U.S. troops from the K2 base and went into new, amicable deals with Russia (Ortmann, Stefanie, 2008: 363–378). The Kyrgyz leaders likewise close links with Russia, and moved away from Western model of democracy. The relations with America soured as Kyrgyzstan threatened to close the Manas facility after the Tulip Revolution. Russia has reconnected with Kyrgyzstan through trade, specially energy sector. Russia's achievement in Central Asia may fortify its image as a Great Power, one that can influence and project power in its range of prominence.

CONCLUSION:

The Russian reaction to the color revolutions was to a great extent effective: the advancement made by the color revolutions was hindered, relations among the color revolution nations and Russia came back to usual, and utilized the color revolutions to advance its anti-Western belief of independent democracy to the world. However, the color revolutions prevailing in their prompt objectives of toppling fixed elections and supplanting corrupt governments. The color revolutions neglected to create enduring democratic reform, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine. The authorities of Russia considered the West as the reason for the color revolutions. They guarantee that Western-financed NGOs, particularly those engaged with democracy advancement and election observing, were working intentionally to sabotage the governments of the color revolution nations and helping the youth and activists movements that impelled the protests to victory. Criticizing the West didn't increase a lot of footing in the global field, yet it provided the ground for the anti-Western narrative in Russia.

The revolutions added to the sentiment of Western infringement on Russia's range of authority, ongoing since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. They appeared to fit in an example of Western interference in the post-Communist circle, alongside the NATO developments, the expanding nearness of NGOs in post-Soviet countries, and America bargains for basing rights in Central Asia to help in NATO and America military activity in Afghanistan. Russia was additionally undermined by the development of human rights mediations into sovereign countries, remembering the NATO intercessions in the Balkans, and the attack of Iraq and Afghanistan to battle terrorism. These activities made Russia dread mediation into its own battle against Chechen protestors, which included the two demonstrations of fear and affirmed human rights infringement by the Russian troops.

The color revolutions outlined the threats of Western democracy-advancement to Russia yet, in addition, the manners in which that it could be countered. Russia could use the opinion of the public, by criticizing Western involvement in the color revolutions, by endeavouring to show an example of Western infringement in Central Asia, and by upholding for elective ways to deal with democracy and national autonomy. Furthermore, when these choices miss the mark, Russia has demonstrated its ability to mediate in the countries undermined by revolution, using soft force, and raising by using military power. Nicolas Bouchet expresses, "The main matter isn't whether leaders of Russia accept their discussion about color revolutions or blame this when they have different thought processes in mediating abroad. In any case, governments of West must pay attention to the way that Russia has updated its official statement about color revolutions and created legitimizations for a military reaction (Bouchet, Nicolas, 2016: 1–4)." Given the achievement that Russia accomplished in opposing the color revolutions, all things considered, Russia will keep this triumphant methodology.

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